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Case Comment
from the defendant would not only be forced to satisfy himself as to
the propriety of title, but also would have to make extensive inquiries
into whether the defendant was properly registered under the act
applicable to the type of business being carried on.82 To expect a
purchaser or assignee from the defendant to ascertain the nature of
the transaction and the type of business carried on may be too onerous.
As pointed out by Lord Wright in Vita Food Products v. Urius
Shipping Company Ltd.,83 public policy should be looked at in a wide
sense. Mr. Justice Kelly quotes St. John Shipping Corp. v. J. Rank
Ltd.84 for a similar proposition-when nullification of a bargain would
result in a windfall, public policy would dictate that the contract
should be enforced.84
It is hoped that in the future other courts will see fit to use the
type of functional analysis demonstrated by the Ontario Court of
Appeal. This type of analysis will often prevent a grave injustice by
averting strict technicalities in the law and enabling the court to
look at the substance of the problem in its social surroundings.
CLIFFORD S. NELSOW :
RAY L. STEELE::
CIVIL RIGHTS
Bintner v. Regina Public School Board District #4 (1966) 55 D.L.R.
(2d) 646.
EXCLUSION OF CHILD PLAINTIFF FROM PUBLIC SCHOOL BECAUSE OF THE
RELIGIOUS FAITH OF HERSELF AND HER PARENTS-SCHOOL COMMUNITY
-SASKATCHEWAN BILL OF RIGHTS AND RELEVANT SASKATCHEWAN
SCHOOL LEGISLATION-CoMPARATIVE ONTARIO LEGISLATION.
It is with a great deal of dismay that layman and lawyer alike
look to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of Saskatchewan. The
case of Bintner v. Regina Public School Board District #4, :' purports
to make religious discrimination in education a matter of provincial
public policy.
The fact that freedom of religion is a basic tenet of the Canadian
political-legal structure,2 seems not however to have imposed itself
upon the thinking of Bence C.J.Q.B., nor Culliton C.J.S. and his
brothers in the Court of Appeal. In view of the continuing public
pressure for equality in all areas of community life in regard to race,
* Clifford S. Nelson, B.A. (U. of Toronto), and *Ray L. Steele, B.A. (U.
of Manitoba) are students entering the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
82 Id.
83 [1939] A.C. 277, 293.
84 [1956] 3 All E.R. 683.
1 (1966) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 646.
2 Saumur v. Quebec, [19531 2 S.C.R. 299.
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religion, colour or nationality, this decision, with all due respect, seems
a most unrealistic and retrogressive step.
The facts reported in the decision of the Court of Appeal are
as follows: The Bintner family, all of the Roman Catholic faith, and
former separate school supporters, notified the city assessor that they
wished to be assessed from 1958 on, as public school supporters. The
mother of the infant plaintiff then applied to enroll the child at a
public school. This application was refused by the Principal of the
school because of a directive issued by the school board, forbidding
the enrollment of Roman and Greek Catholics in the public schools,
whether they were separate or public school supporters. In June of
1965, the infant plaintiff, through her father as next friend, brought
an action against the Board of Trustees for the Regina School Board
District #4, seeking an injunction pursuant to the provisions of the
Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act.3
The main defence asserted by the school board was that their
actions were not discriminatory on any ground because they were,
as a result of the provisions in the School Act 4 under no obligation
to educate the child. The plaintiff's response was clear: that the
wording of the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act5 is quite plain; that,
to refuse her admission because she is a Roman Catholic is ipso facto
proof of discrimination on religious grounds. This was substantiated
by the plaintiff's reading into the record a portion of the oral dis-
covery of the representative of the defendant, who admitted that the
only ground for excluding the child was because of her relig'on.
Q. So the basis of exclusion is the Roman Catholic faith?
A. That is correct.
Q. And apart from that one exclusion it is general practice to
admit all children within the geographical area of that particular age
to kindergarten?
A. That's right.
At trial, the decision was given by Bench C.J.Q.B., who in deny-
ing the injunction, said,
In my view the refusal was not an act of discrimination but was based on
good and proper reasons.6
It is to the great misfortune of all concerned that the -learned
Chief Justice neglected to point out what those "good and proper
reasons" were.
This unsatisfactory decision was taken on appeal by the infant
plaintiff, who reasserted her rights under the provincial Bill of Rights
Act. The Court of Appeal directed itself to the single question of
3 R.S.S. 1953, c. 345, ss. 13(1), (2), 16.
4 R.S.S. 1965, c. 184.
5 R.S.S. 1953, c. 345, s. 13(1).
6 (1966) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 648.
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whether the act of the school board in denying the plaintiff the right
of enrollment, under the circumstances as disclosed by the evidence,
constituted discrimination within the intent and purport of section
13(1) (now section 11(1)7). If so, the plaintiff was entitled to the
relief sought under section 16 (now section 148), and, if not, the trial
Judge was right in dismissing the action.
Initially, Culliton C.J.S. rejected out of hand the plaintiff's con-
tentions, which were based on the school board representative's admis-
sions on discovery, coupled with the wording of the Saskatchewan Bill
of Rights Act by stating:
I do not think the problem can be so simply stated nor can the conclusion
be drawn that entry was refused primarily because the Plaintiff was of
the Roman Catholic faith.9
It was not entirely erroneous of the Chief Justice to point out the
problem was not to be resolved so "simply", for an invaluable service
might have been done the plaintiff and the community at large, had
the Col.rt conducted a more intensive search into the law of this area.
A canvass of several jurisdictions might have added weight to the
Court's:;conclusions; but to fail to accord any weight to the sworn
testimony of a witness is evidence of a blatant disregard of relatively
indisputable fact. While not prima facie determinative of the issue,
it is submitted that the Court failed to place these facts in the proper
perspective, in relation to the Plaintiff's statutory rights.
Cuiton C.J.S. then expressed his point of view on the school
board's alleged "right of denial". He pointed out that in 1963 the
board changed its policy so that entry to thd public school was
dependent not upon the parents' taxpaying status, but upon whether
the child was a "member of the public school community". Prior to
this change, children of all public school supporters regardless of their
faith were admitted to the public schools. The defendant refused to
admit children who belonged to the "separate school community",
taking the position that this was neither their responsibility nor their
duty.
Since Saskatchewan law allows a minority group within a public
school district to establish a separate school,lo the Court felt that the
board was justified in establishing as the "public school community"
all those children other than those of the minority faith. The non-
enrollment of the "minority faith Roman Catholic" plaintiff, the
Court said, was the inevitable result of the policy but not its purpose.
In my opinion the policy adopted by the public school board regardless
of the result, is not an act of discrimination as intended and envisioned
by the Legislature in the enactment of section 13(1).11
7 R.S.S. 1965, c. 378.
8 Id.
9 (1966) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 653.
10 School Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 184, s. 40 (formerly R.S.S. 1953, c. 169, s. 39).
11 (1966) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 6534.
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The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and concluded:
The real issue between the parties is not one of discrimination but whether
in law the Plaintiff has a right to attend the public school, or in other
words, whether the policy adopted by the public school board resulting
in the exclusion of the Plaintiff from the public school is right or wrong
in law. This was not the issue before the trial Court or before this Court.
The Plaintiff's claim for an injunction rested solely on the plea of dis-
crimination under section 13(1). As this plea was not substantiated the
trial Judge was right in dismissing the action.J2
The question of discrimination under section 13(1) was clearly
at issue here, and the Court of Appeal either misunderstood this
action, or, for some unknown reason, purposely skirted the issue. In so
doing the Court has clearly disregarded its duty. Whether it was not
a part of plaintiff's submissions at all, or just not pressed in argument
is of little consequence. The form of the action ought to have little
relevance in modern courts to the merit of the respective positions of
the parties. The school board's decision was clearly predicated on
religious grounds, and the Court should have looked to this problem,
whether or not (and it was) raised.
The Court of Appeal looked to find the intent of the Legislature in
regard to sections 13(1) and 16, and held that "notwithstanding the
result" the policy adopted by the board was not an act of discrimina-
tion. This is tantamount to saying that as long as one does not wish
to discriminate, it is not discrimination, even if his actions result in
discrimination. Thus, it was not caught within the Act. The motive of
a defendant under section 16 (as it then was) is not at issue, since
nowhere in the relevant sections is there a "motive type" escape
clause which would justify a course of conduct which would be dis-
criminatory if the escape clause was not present. The Saskatchewan
Bill of Rights would be a nullity if, because of their motives, those
caught in its sections could escape.
The Act is in force because the Legislature, in this instance the
conscience of the public of Saskatchewan, found certain practices in
the community repugnant to desired legal standards and hence abhor-
rent to the modern sense of public morals. When prejudice exposes it-
self publicly the Legislature is clearly incapable of eliminating it. This
Act, then, is aimed at consequences; and where these consequences
take the form of discrimination in 'education' (or unfair housing or
work practices) the Court clearly must enjoin the conduct. Primarily,
Culliton C.J.S. concerned himself with the rights of the school board,
and their alleged power to take an arbitrary stand on "who may be
educated where", but I would suggest that the learned Chief Justice
misdirected his attention to the motives and not to the result.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff's father was, at the material
time, assessed as a public school supporter, and had been so for the
previous seven years, when he had notified the City of Regina assessor
of his desire to be changed from separate school assessment. While
neither the trial Court nor the Court of Appeal commented on the
12 Id. at 654.
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validity of the school board's interpretation of a ratepayer's rights,
that religious faith not payment of taxes determined a child's admis-
sion into school, they seemed to impliedly agree with the school
board's reasoning. Section 40 of the School Act'3 clearly sets out
a religious minority's rights of education:
The minority of ratepayers in any district, whether Protestant or Roman
Catholic, may establish a separate school therein; and in such a case the
ratepayers establishing the school shall be liable only to assessments
of such rates as they impose upon themselves in respect thereof.
The 1963 directive issued by the school board purported to clarify
its interpretation of the question of taxes by stating:
(3) It is our interpretation that payment of taxes to the public school
system does not entitle children to attend our schools. If parents are
Catholic their taxes should be paid to the separate school system.1 4
Has the Court failed to determine the rights of a ratepayer
under section 40 of the School Act? An examination must be made of
two early *Saskatchewan cases in which the rights of a ratepayer of
school taxes were at issue. In Neida'5, it was held that a person not of
the religious faith of a minority established separate school, cannot
escape the obligation of being assessed for the support of the public
school. Conversely Bartz"6 , a Roman Catholic, was at his own request
entered on the assessment roll as a public school supporter. The Court
found that all the ratepayers of a separate school district of the
religious faith of the minority establishing the district should be
assessed as separate school supporters whether or not they voted
for such establishment.17
The point was shortly put by Lamont J.:
The test to be applied to determine whether any ratepayer is a public
or separate school supporter is: Is he of the religious faith of the
minority?' 8
These early cases then provide a base for the defendant's interpre-
tation of the position of the ratepayer.
However, it will be seen that these cases were decided in 1917, and
having regard, therefore, to changing social conditions, as seen in both
educational policy and the provincial social legislation, these decisions
can be distinguished, and are in effect not binding. The Regina of
1917, twelve years after Saskatchewan attained Provincial status, did
not have a large number of school buildings or personnel to man them.
Thus, it may be surmised, in order to prevent an overtaxing of the
facilities of either school system, a harshly imposed quantitative limit
had to be applied. This was done by restricting access to public schools
to those of the populace who were not of a minority religious group,
having their own school system. An arbitrary division along religious
13 School Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 184.14 (1966) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 646, at 651.
15 [1917J 1 W.W.R. 1088.16 (1917] 1 W.W.R. 1105.
17 Id., at 1106, per Hamilton, C.J.
1s Id., at 1116.
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lines was conceivably proper in 1917 so as to produce separate but
equal facilities in which each pays his own way. This archaic justifica-
tion does not apply today where sufficient finances are available to
accommodate an influx of minority religion school children. Of more
import, however, is a consideration of the change in official social
policy of the Province. Where freedom of religion, especially in
regard to schooling, is part of provincial law (The Bill of Rights9),
the above cases cannot remain authoritative; their basis, whatever
justification may be envisioned for them, is securely attached to
religious division in respect to schooling, and because of the freedoms
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights Act, no division is allowable. Clearly
the early decisions are out of step with present day legislative senti-
ment, and should be expressly overruled.
From 1958 to 1965 the City of Regina accepted Mr. Bintner's
taxes and put them towards the payment of public school costs. On
this basis, before the 1963 directive of the school board, the plaintiff
would have been, presumably, admitted to school. Therefore it might
be said that the City assessor and the school board have, by accepting
his taxes, evidenced the fact that Bintner was for eight years accepted
as a public school supporter. Clearly then, by the filing of his notice
for change of school support, and the acceptance of it by the city
assessor, it would be inequitable to deny a man, who has, in all good
faith, done all required of him, those rights which he had assumed he
had paid for, for eight years.
The problem of interpretation must turn on the meaning of
section 40 of the School Act. Even assuming that the words "rate
payers" in the second half of the section refer to the same words in
the first part of section 40, as is implied by Haultain C.J. in the Bartz
case20, the interpretation of the section still falls to the plaintiff's
advantage. Could it not be argued that the final words of the section,
... shall be liable only to assessments of such rates as they impose upon
themselves in respect thereof
evince the intent that the Legislature, having left the rates as "self-
imposed", was allowing the ratepayer to "opt out" of payment of
separate school taxes, if so desired? While the ratepayer would be,
at law, still liable for payment of school taxes, these could clearly be
put towards the public school's allotment.
Further support is forthcoming from section 27 (2) of The School
Assessment Act21, which states:
A person who is legally assessable in a public school district shall not be
liable to assessment for a separate school district in the same area.
If then, Bintner is regarded as a public school supporter, section
27(2) places Bintner in exact contraposition to where he would be if
forced to follow clause 3 of the March 19 directive:
19 R.S.S. 1953, c. 345, s. 13(1), (2).
20 Supra, note 16 at 1113.
21 School Assessment Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 187.
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* .. If parents are Catholic their taxes should be paid to the separate
school system.
There is little argument that in ordering men's conduct the valid
legislation of the Provincial Legislature has more force than a mere
directive of a school board, when the two meet "head on".
Investigation will reveal considerable similarities in the respective
legislative frameworks of Saskatchewan and Ontario. The Ontario
Public Schools Act 22, as well as The School Attendance Act of
Saskatchewan23 , give to a person who has attained the proper age, at
or before a relevant date, the right to attend, in the following school
year, a public school, in his school section, unless his parent or
guardian is a separate school supporter. The Ontario Act then goes on
to allow this right to persons, in specific circumstances, notwithstand-
ing their religious affiliation:
S. 6(2) Subject to section 5, where a child and his parent or guardian
reside in a school section in a residence that is assessed to the support
of the public schools .. the child shall be admitted to a public school by
the board of that section without payment of fee.
(3) subject to section 5, where a child whose parent or guardian is
not a separate school supporter moves in with his parent or guardian
into a residence that is assessed for separate school purposes ... upon
the filing of a notice of change... the child shall be admitted to a public
school by the board of the section without the payment of a fee.24
A recent decision of the Ontario High Court in the case of Leblanc
v. Board of Education25 examined this section of the Ontario legislation
and found for the plaintiff, thereby completely differing from the
principle held out in Bintner. In the Leblanc case, parents of school age
children, who had been previously separate school supporters in an-
other municipality, moved into a house whose previous owner was
assessed on the public school assessment rolls. Under the purchase
agreements they received the benefit of the prepayment of municipal
school taxes. The Court held that the children were wrongfully denied
admittance to the public school, the school board having classified the
parents as separate school supporters. It was held that the parents
could not be assessed as separate school supporters, and that since the
children were living in a house assessed as supporting public schools,
they were entitled to be enrolled, under sections 5 (1) (a), and 6 (2) of
the Act. Ferguson J. stated:
It must appear therefore, that prima facie the child must be admitted
unless his parent or guardian is a separate school supporter.26
Look, also, to The Separate Schools Act27, where, had there been
an equivalent Saskatchewan enactment, Bintner's problem might have
been solved:
22 R.S.O. 1960, c. 330, s. 5(1) (a).
23 R.S.S. 1965, c. 186, ss. 3(1), 4.
24 R.S.O. 1960, c. 330.
25 Leblanc and Leblanc v. Bd. of Education for the City of Hamilton,
[19631 1 O.R. 20, (1963) 35 D.L.R. (2d) 548 (H.C.).
26 Id., at 22, per Ferguson J.
27 Separate Schools Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 368, s. 53(1).
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S. 53(1) A Roman Catholic who desires to withdraw his support from a
separate school shall give notice thereof in writing to the clerk of the
municipality on or before the 4th Wednesday in May in any year, other-
wise he shall be deemed to be a supporter of the school.
While there is no Saskatchewan equivalent, this Ontario legisla-
tion may be compared to the "opting-out" interpretation of section
40 of The School Act of Saskatchewan, to add a further degree of
weight.
A question which was, but slightly, touched upon by the Court,
and one which raises a number of prickly questions, particularly as
to its practical application, is the power of the school board to act on
the question of the admission or exclusion of a child from a particular
school. The school during its operative hours is a social unit within
the community, and as such must be organized and regulated by a
central superior power. This power, at an intermediate level, is
exercised by the various school boards, and although it is not disputed
that the power is present, certain restrictions must be placed on its
scope. One of these restrictions is that the school board has nowhere
in its statutory rights and duties, the power to exclude for reasons of
religion. The responsibilities of the school board are found in the
School Act of Saskatchewan,28 and in no relevant provision of this
Act is the school board granted a right to determine the admissability
of a child to a school. Certainly they are granted wide discretionary
power over the conduct of the school, but only over those who are
registered pupils of that school. The admission of children is covered
by a clear statutory enactment, and if a child conforms to this pro-
vision he must be admitted. (Conduct within the school rendering the
child subject to suspension or expulsion is another matter.)
Except as herein provided, every resident person between the ages of
6 and 21 years shall have the right to attend the school and to receive in.
struction appropriate to his or her grade.29
The Ontario legislation is to the same effect,30 the public school
boards operating schools in accordance with the provisions of The
Public Schools Act,31 The Schools Administration Act,32 and the De-
partment of Education Act.33 Further, under the latter statute, the
Minister is given certain powers as to the making of regulations
governing the admission of pupils 3 4
Looking, now, to the authorities, it was held in Yarwood v.
Smith's Falls Board df Education,35 that children have a prima facie
right to be admitted to a public school. This was a case of justified
exclusion from the school by the board, because of a refusal by parents
28 School Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 184, s. 118(7) (9) (35) (37) (39) (43) (45), s. 212.
29 Id., s. 246(3).
30 The Public Schools Act, R.S.O. 1960, e. 330, s. 74(a).
31 Id.
32 The Schools Administration Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 361.
33 Department of Education Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 94.
34 Id., s. 12(i) (ii).
35 Yarwood v. Smith's Falls Board of Education, (1922) 23 O.W.N. 38.
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to allow their children to be innoculated in the midst of a smallpox
epidemic.
In the absence of lawful excuse, parents are obliged by statute to send
their children to school; and, on the other hand, they have a prima facie
right, in general, to have their children of school age admitted to the
public schools.3 6
Further, in Saskatchewan itself, it was held in the case of Wilkin-
son v. Thomas et al,37 that the governing principle of the School Act3s
is that children between the ages referred to in the statute have a
right to attend school and receive instruction. The right being the right
of the child itself, and not a matter left to the discretion of its parents
or the school board.
A final point for comment is the Court of Appeal's preoccupation
with the question of a specific school community. It seems that the
Court concurred in the school board's belief that the addition of
Roman Catholic kindergarten pupils would "undermine" the concept
of "public school community". Once again both the Saskatchewan
and Ontario statutes are similar in their operative force.
In Saskatchewan, The School Act expressly points out that,
No religious instruction except as hereinafter provided shall be permitted
in the school of any district from the opening of the school until one half
hour previous to its closing in the afternoon, after which time any such
instruction permitted or desired by the board may be given.39
no emblem of any regilious faith, denomination, order, sect, society or
association shall be displayed in or on any public school premises during
school hours, nor shall any person teach or be permitted to teach in any
public school while wearing the garb of any religious faith, denomination,
order, sect, society or association. 40
Moreover, under the Ontario legislation,
no pupil in public school shall be required to read or study in or from a
religious book, or to join in an exercise of devotion or religion, objected
to by his parent or guardian.41
In these sections, it can, in essence, be seen that a non-religious
community was envisioned for the public schools, and clearly it was
this type of "community" that the school board did not wish to dis-
rupt. However, it is suggested, had the Court looked further into
the legislation, the defendant school board's argument would have
fallen.
Any child shall have the privilege of leaving the school room when
religious instruction is commenced as provided for in section 210, or of
remaining without taking part in any religious instruction that is given,
if the parents or guardian so desire.42
36 Id., at 39, per Lennox J.
37 Wilkinson v. Thomas et al., [1928) 2 W.W.R. 700 (K.B.).38 R.S.S. 1920, c. 110.
39 School Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 184, s. 210(1).
40 Id., s. 269(1).
41 The Public Schools Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 330, s. 7(1).
42 School Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 194, s. 211.
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The Court's failure to deal with decisions in other jurisdictions
with similar legislation is incomprehensible. In Donald v. Board of
Education,43 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that under the rele-
vant statutes and regulations, pupils in public schools (or their parents
or guardians) who refuse on religious grounds to salute the flag or
sing the national anthem are entitled to refrain from participation
without forfeiting their right to attend school. The term, religious
exercises, is left vague by the statute, and the Court would not take it
upon itself to say that the conduct described was not included by the
statutory expression. As to the claim that the plaintiff's conduct was
disturbing and injurious to the moral tone of the school:
The regulations . . . specifically contemplate that a pupil who objects tojoining in religious exercise may be permitted to retire or to remain,
provided he maintains decorous conduct during the exercises. To do just
that could not ... be viewed as conduct injurious to the moral tone of the
school or class.44
The leading case on the subject is Chabot v. School Commis-
sioners,45 where the only public schools in the municipality were those
operated by commissioners who were elected by taxpayers, the reli-
gious majority of which were Roman Catholics. It was held that a dis-
sentient taxpayer (a Jehovah's Witness) who was a resident of the
municipality was entitled to have his children admitted to those
schools. This was so, notwithstanding that dissentients could establish
their own schools or send their children to a school in a neighbouring
municipality, and thereupon become exempt from paying taxes to
maintain the schools in their own municipality. Furthermore, being
compelled to send his children to school until age sixteen, he could
also insist that they be exempted from Catholic religious instruction
and acts of devotion.
I would conclude that Chabot had the right to demand that his
children be admitted to the school of the respondents ... it is necessary
to conclude that children who attend a school are not obliged to follow a
religious teaching to which their father is opposed.4 6
It is submitted that the Bintner decision is wrong, both in law and
in the trend of modern public policy. At the least, the case deserved a
far more intensive treatment than the Court of Appeal was prepared
to give it, and for this reason it is unfortunate the Court of Appeal
did not see fit to grant the plaintiff the leave applied for-to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
FRANK L. ROTH"
43 Donald et al. v. Board of Education for the City of Hamilton, [1945]
O.R. 518 (C.A.).
44 Id., at 530.
45 Chabot v. School Commissioners of Lamordiere and A. G. Que. (1958),
12 D.L.R. (2d) 796.
46 Id., at 801.
* Frank L. Roth, B.A. (University of Toronto), is a student entering the
third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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